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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 NEA-10 IO-14 ISO-00 AEC-11 ACDA-19

CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01

SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 NIC-01 OIC-04 DRC-01

CU-04 H-03 NSC-10 SS-20 /178 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2179

INFO ALL CSCE CAPITALS 44

USNMR SHAPE

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XMT ZEN/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

XMT ZEN/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 5593

VIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL MBFR

EO 11652: GDS TAGS: PFOR

SUBJ: CSCE: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

REF: GENEVA 5401

BEGIN SUMMARY: FIRST ROUND OF DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF CBMS
ENDED LAST WEEK AND WILL BE FOLLOWED, DURING REMAINDER OF MONTH,
BY CONSIDERATION OF OTHER MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY.
HIGHLIGHT OF LAST WEEK'S DELIBERATIONS WAS COMPREHENSIVE
SOVIET STATEMENT (SEPTEL) EMPHASIZING USSR ENVISAGED CBMS OF
ONLY VERY LIMITED CHARACTER. NEUTRALS AND NATO ALLIES ARGUED
FOR MORE SUBSTANTIAL MEASURES AND THEIR EXCHANGES WITH
SOVIET BLOC DELEGATIONS LEFT SOBERING IMPRESSION WITHIN
SUB-COMMITTEE OF WIDE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AS WELL AS
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OF SOVIET DISTRUST OF WESTERN INTENTIONS IN CBM AREA. END SUMMARY

1. SUB-COMMITTEE ON CBMS WOUND UP SECOND WEEK OF DETAILED

DISCUSSIONS OF MODALITIES OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS. (AS IN PREVIOUS WEEK, LITTLE ATTENTION WAS ACCORDED TO QUESTION OF EXCHANGING OBSERVERS.) SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES LIMITED THEIR REMARKS TO CBMS COVERING MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS BUT, AS BEFORE, DID NOT ATTEMPT TO OBSTRUCT OTHER DELEGATIONS' INCLUSION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS AS TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION. SOVIETS MADE MAJOR STATEMENT (SEPTEL), WHICH WAS SECONDED BY THEIR ALLIES, IN WHICH THEY ARGUED THAT NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE GIVEN ONLY OF MULTI-DIVISIONAL MANEUVERS TAKING PLACE IN SELECTED AREAS AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE NO MORE THAN ABOUT 5 OR 6 DAYS PRIOR TO THE MANEUVER. SOVIETS EXPLAINED THAT, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT AN ADVERSARY MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY LONGER NOTIFICATION BY THREATENING AREA FROM WHICH MANEUVER-ING TROOPS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. THIS INDICATION OF SOVIET MISTRUST HAD SOBERING EFFECT WITHIN SUB-COMMITTEE AND PROMPTED UK DEL TO STRESS NEED FOR AT LEAST MINIMUM LEVEL OF TRUST AMONG PARTICIPANTS IN ORDER ACHIEVE PROGRESS ON CBMS. FRENCH DELEGATE OBSERVED HE WOULD BE UNABLE MAKE OPTIMISTIC REPORT TO HIS AUTHORITIES ON SUB-COMMITTEE'S WORK AND WARNED THAT PROGRESSIVE DILUTION OF CBMS MIGHT LEAD TO THEIR BEING DROPPED ALTOGETHER. NONETHELESS, SUB-COMMITTEE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY RESUME GRAPPLING WITH CBM ISSUES FOLLOWING NEXT TWO WEEKS OF DISCUSSIONS ON OTHER MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY. FURTHER DETAILS OF LAST WEEK'S DELIBERATIONS ON CBM MODALITIES ARE GIVEN BELOW.

2. GEOGRAPHIC AREAS. SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT CBMS SHOULD APPLY TO ALL PARTICIPATING NATIONS IN AREA OF EUROPE BUT THAT PRIOR NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE GIVEN ONLY OF THOSE MANEUVERS TAKING PLACE IN SELECTED AREAS, DEFINED EITHER AS BORDER REGIONS OR "SENSITIVE ZONES". THEY DREW LIMITED SUPPORT FROM CYPRUS, BUT SEVERAL NATO ALLIES, JOINED BY SWISS AND SWEDES, ARGUED AGAINST CONCEPT OF SPECIAL ZONES AND CALLED FOR NOTIFICATION TO APPLY TO MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS THROUGHOUT "WHOLE OF EUROPE". SOVIETS COUNTERED BY HIGHLIGHTING DIFFICULTY OF DELIMITING "EUROPE". YUGOSLAVS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BORDER AREAS WERE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH CBMS, BUT THOUGHT CRITERION MIGHT BE FOUND CONFIDENTIAL

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WHICH WOULD REFLECT THIS WITHOUT BEING RESTRICTIVE.

3. DEFINITION OF "MAJOR" MILITARY MANEUVER OR MOVEMENT. NATO ALLIES AND SWEDES HELD TO IDEA THAT, AS RULE OF THUMB, "MAJOR" SHOULD BE TAKEN TO MEAN DIVISION LEVEL AND ABOVE, BUT THAT IN SOME GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATIONS BRIGADE LEVEL MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE THRESHOLD AT WHICH NOTIFICATION WOULD BE CALLED FOR. AUSTRIANS FAVORED PUTTING THRESHOLD AT DIVISION LEVEL IN CASE OF MULTINATIONAL MANEUVERS AND AT BRIGADE LEVEL IN CASE OF NATIONAL MANEUVERS. NORWAY STRESSED NEED FOR INCLUDING NAVAL AND AIR AS WELL AS GROUND FORCES IN DEFINING "MILITARY". UK EXPRESSED VIEW THAT NAVAL AND AIR UNITS SHOULD BE COVERED ONLY WHEN PART OF A COMBINED MANEUVER OR MOVEMENT WITH GROUND FORCES.

- 4. EXTENT OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION. STATEMENTS BY SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES IN FAVOR OF GIVING NOTIFICATION AS SHORT AS 5 OR 6 DAYS PRIOR TO A MANEUVER LED TO SIZABLE NUMBER OF INTERVENTIONS BY NATO ALLIES IN FAVOR OF GIVING NOTICE 60 DAYS IN ADVANCE. SOME POINTED OUT THAT 5 OR 6 DAYS WAS TOO SHORT A TIME TO ARRANGE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS. SWEDEN, YUGOSLAVIA, SWITZERLAND AND CYPRUS ALSO LINED UP AGAINST SOVIETS IN ARGUING FOR NOTIFICATION OF FROM 30 TO 60 DAYS. SWEDES ALSO SAID THEY WOULD BE PREPARED SUBMIT ANNUAL CALENDARS OF MANEUVERS SUBJECT TO LATER AMENDMENT. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS FAVORING NOTIFICATION OF 30 DAYS OR MORE ALSO INDICATED THAT ALLOWANCE WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE FOR NOTIFYING LAST-MINUTE MANEUVERS OR CHANGES OF PLAN AT SHORTER NOTICE.
- 5. METHOD AND CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES ENDORSED YUGOSLAV SUGGESTION THAT NOTIFICATION SPECIFY MANEUVER'S NATURE, OBJECTIVE, TIME PERIOD, ZONE AND LEVEL OF FORCES. UK, BELGIUM AND SWEDEN DEFENDED NEED FOR MORE DETAILS, SUCH AS THOSE SPECIFIED IN PAPERS TABLED EARLIER BY UK AND NORWAY. NO ONE CHALLENGED SUGGESTIONS, REFERRED TO BY SOME DELEGATIONS, THAT NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE THROUGH BILATERAL CHANNELS. THERE WAS ALSO PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF WHO SHOULD GIVE NOTIFICATION IN THE CASE OF MULTI-NATIONAL MOVEMENTS/MANEUVERS.
- 6. NATURE OF OBLIGATION. THERE WERE FURTHER EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FROM SEVERAL NATO ALLIES AND NEUTRALS FOR IDEA CONFIDENTIAL

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THAT CBM OBLIGATION SHOULD BE MORALLY AND POLITICALLY BINDING BUT NOT ENTAIL A LEGAL COMMITMENT. UK AND DENMARK EXPRESSED VIEW THAT FORMULATION STIPULATING THAT PARTICIPANTS "WILL" NOTIFY MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS WOULD SATISFY THIS CRITERION, BUT AT SAME TIME THERE WAS PREVAILING SENTIMENT APPARENT AMONG NEUTRALS AND NATO ALLIES THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM NOW. YUGOSLAVS EXPRESSED VIEW THAT SUB-COMMITTEE MIGHT PRODUCE DOCUMENT IN WHICH VARYING DEGREES OF COMMITMENT WERE ATTACHED TO THE CBM'S COVERED. THEY SUGGESTED THAT SOME OF THE MORE FAR-REACHING MEASURES, SUCH AS ACTUAL REDUCTION OF MANEUVERS, MIGHT BE FORMULATED IN TERMS OF AN INTENTION TO EXERCISE "SELF-RESTRAINT".

7. ADDITIONAL CBM'S. SPANISH DELEGATION PROVIDED FURTHER DETAILS OF ITS PROPOSAL OF ADDITIONAL CBM PROMOTING EXCHANGES AMONG MILITARY OFFICIALS OF NON-ALLIED NATIONS (SEPTEL). ROMANIANS ALSO EXPLAINED THAT THEIR PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE AMONG CBMS AND UNDERTAKING TO REFRAIN FROM DEPLOYING NUCLEAR ARMS ON FOREIGN TERRITORY WAS MEANT TO PREVENT NEW DEPLOYMENTS AND NOT TO BRING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF THOSE NOW EXISTING.BASSIN

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To: STATE INFO ALL CSCE CAPITALS

USNMR SHAPE USCINCEUR USLOSACLANT USDOCOSOUTH XMT ZEN ALGIERS

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